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POOLING AND UNITIZATION IN TEXAS
I. TERMINOLOGY
Pooled Unit: A unit formed by the bringing together of separately
owned interests under the provisions of pooling clauses 
of leases or of some special agreement.
Proration Unit: Refers to a designated acreage content, which can be
one or more leases, filed with the Railroad Commission 
in order to obtain an allowable for an already-drilled well.
II. THE RULE OF CAPTURE AND THE EVOLUTION OF POOLING
The rule of capture has been defined by the Texas Supreme Court in Elliff 
v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558 (Tex., 1948) as follows:
The owner of a tract of land acquires title to the oil or gas which he
produces from wells on his land, even though part of the oil or gas may
have migrated from adjoining lands.
Therefore, said owner can appropriate the oil or gas that has flowed from 
adjacent lands without the consent of the owner of those lands, and without 
incurring liability to him for drainage. The non-liability is based upon the theory that 
after the drainage the title or property interest of the former owner is gone. 
Obviously, given this theory, the adjacent land owners have traditionally protected 
themselves by drilling offset wells that would intercept the oil or gas otherwise 
produced by the neighboring wells.
It is not difficult to ascertain the two major problems associated with the rule 
of capture and the traditional response:
(a) It creates a substantial amount of over-drilling, which translates to 
inefficient draining of oil and gas from a pool;
(b) By focusing on surface property lines, the rule encourages the 
dissipation of the reservoir’s natural energy.
The State of Texas, slowly but surely, recognized these shortcomings 
involved in blindly following the rule of capture and thus, the conservation statutes,
POOLING AND UNITIZATION IN TEXAS PAGE 1
implemented and enforced by theTexas Railroad Commission, began their steady, 
but inevitable, erosion of the rule.
The basic constitutionality of conservation was established in Ohio Oil 
Company v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 (U.S. Supreme Court, 1900). Without going into 
the details of this case, it suffices to say that private property rights of a mineral 
owner can be constitutionally limited for the purpose of conserving the resource for 
the public benefit.
One obvious way to harness the rule of capture, and the resulting over- 
drilling, is the ability to control the spacing and drilling of wells. The Oil and Gas 
Division of the Texas Railroad Commission is generally vested with the power and 
charged with the duty to administer oil and gas conservation statutes by adopting 
rules and entering orders to:
(a) prevent the waste of oil and gas;
(b) protect the correlative rights of the owners.
Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co., 380 S.W.2d 556 (Tex. 1964).
The Commission's statewide well spacing rule is the famous Rule 37, 
adopted in 1919. It has been changed six times over the years with respect to 
minimum distances to lease lines and between wells on the same lease. The last 
change was in 1962 when the minimum distances of 467 feet and 1200 feet, 
respectively, were adopted. This rule governs all wells for which no special field 
rules have been adopted. (See exceptions in Commission Districts 7B and 9).
The Commission's statewide density rule is Rule 38, and this rule outlines the 
minimum acreage required for each well within a field in Texas. Rule 38 also gives 
guidelines for a second well to be drilled within a lease or drilling unit so that 
sufficient acreage can be committed to the second well under the acreage 
requirements of the Railroad Commission.
Rule 40 of the statewide rules allows inclusion of acreage under applicable 
field rules into a development or proration unit if a plat is filed along with a Form P- 
12. The purpose of the Operator in utilizing Rule 40 to form a development or 
proration unit is to add a sufficient number of tracts or leases together to form a unit 
and receive the maximum allowable possible for the well located thereon.
Rule 31 is the gas well allowable rule, Rule 42 is the oil discovery allowable 
rule, and Rule 45 is the oil allowable yardstick rule.
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In some instances, the Railroad Commission can even "force pool" acreage 
(Texas Mineral Interest Pooling Act, V.T.C.A. Natural Resources Code §102.001 
et seq).
The purpose of citing the above rules is to show the clear relationship 
between the conservation statutes and their implementation to the evolution of 
pooling and unitization as a method of complying therewith. This paper will focus 
on the problems associated with "voluntary" pooling and unitization.
III. JUDICIAL POOLING, AKA EQUITABLE POOLING
A discussion of judicial pooling in Texas rests upon an understanding of the 
non-apportionment rule, as expressed in the case of Japhet v. McRae, 276 S.W.2d 
669 (Tex. Comm. App. 1925). After leasing, the original lessor of a 15 acre tract 
subdivided his estate. Pursuant to this subdivision, A owned the North 5 acres, and 
B owned the South 10 acres. The lessee drilled two wells on the South 10 acres, 
and the owner of the North 5 acres sought to recover his proportionate share of the 
royalties. The Court concluded that the owner of the North 5 acres should receive 
nothing. The Court utilized a hypothetical situation to justify its conclusion by 
relating to a one million acre lease. The Court said it was absurd to believe that an 
owner of a royalty interest some 75 miles away from the well should be entitled to 
receive his proportionate share or that the owner of the well-site would intend to 
have his share diminished by forced sharing pursuant to the apportionment rule.
This rule leads us into a discussion of judicial pooling or equitable pooling. 
In M uller v. Southerland, 179 S.W.2d 801 (Tex.Civ.App., 1943, writ ref'd, WOM), a 
lease of a larger tract was followed by the conveyance of two 12 acre tracts. The 
Railroad Commission had imposed a spacing and allowable requirement of 20 
acres in the field in which the tracts were located. A well was drilled on each of the 
12 acre tracts, but the lessee used 8 acres of Muller's land for their drilling and 
proration unit to meet the 20 acre spacing requirement. The Mullers claimed a 
proportionate amount of the royalty (8/20) from the wells producing on each 20 acre 
proration unit, but not on the lands owned by them. They claimed that the effect of 
the Railroad Commission's spacing order was to pool all of the interest within the 
20 acre unit utilized by the lessee. The Court followed the Japhet decision in its 
adoption of the non-apportionment rule, and held that the Railroad Commission 
could not by its rules convey property rights which would be the result should a 
sharing or apportionment of the royalties be judicially mandated.
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IV. THE ENTIRETY CLAUSE
The entirety clause provides for a proportionate division of royalty if the 
leased land, either at the time of leasing or subsequently, is owned in severalty or 
in separate tracts. The inclusion of this clause will negate the common law non- 
apportionment rule, and if included in the lease litigated above would have 
mandated a different result.
V. COMMUNITY LEASES
It has long been the rule in Texas that when separately owned tracts of land 
are included by the owners, as lessors, in a single oil and gas lease, the separate 
tracts and all mineral and royalty interests within them are treated as pooled, on a 
surface acreage basis, for the duration of the lease as a matter of law, in the 
absence of an express provision to the contrary. Southland Royalty Co. v. Humble 
Oil & Refining Co., 249 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. 1952); Parker v. Parker, 144 S.W.2d 303 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1940, writ ref'd). Such a lease of separately owned tracts is 
commonly known as a community lease.
The community lease may be "de-communitized" by voluntary partition 
among all the parties to such a lease, so that each of them will acquire the entire 
fee interest in a segregated tract. Garza v. DeMontalvo, 217 S.W.2d 988 (Tex. 
1949).
VI. EXERCISE OF POOLING POWER
The lessee has no power to pool the leased estate with other land unless the 
lessor has expressly authorized it to do so. Therefore, most pooling in Texas is 
accomplished through the exercise of the rights set out in the pooling clause in the 
oil and gas lease. Attached hereto as Exhibit “A” is a “standard” oil and gas lease 
utilized in the State of Texas. You will note that Paragraph Four of the lease 
contains the terms and provisions on which the lessee can pool the lease with other 
lands and leases in order to form a pooled unit. We have attached as Exhibit “B” 
a “standard” pooled unit evidencing how the authority is utilized by the lessee. It is 
critical to remember that the entity that owns the title must exercise the pooling 
clause.
In Pampel Interest, Inc. v. Wall, 797 S.W.2d 392 (Tex.App., 1990 NWH) the 
plaintiff/lessors granted a lease with the primary term of two years to Pampel that 
contained a pooling clause. On the day that the lease was to expire, Zeal Energy 
filed a Unit Declaration for the pooling of some of the lease acreage to form a 160
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acre unit. The unit well had already been commenced, but the operations were not 
upon the lease tract. The plaintiff/lessors and their new lessee sought declaratory 
judgment from the Court that the Pampel lease had expired. Pampel, which was 
owned by the same person who owns Zeal, asserted that Zeal filed the Unit 
Declaration as agent for Pampel. The Court held the Unit Designation was void 
because it was filed by a stranger to the lease title.
VII. EFFECTIVE DATE OF POOLING
The determination of the effective date of the pooling can be critical where 
matters of lease perpetuation and sharing of production are concerned. This 
problem was demonstrated in Sauder v. Frye, 613 S.W.2d 63 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981, 
no writ). In that case, the lease pooling clause provided that:
“...If lessee does create any such unit or units under the rights herein
granted, the lessee shall execute in writing and record in the county or
counties in which each such unit or units created hereunder may be located
an instrument identifying and describing each such unit or units so created.”
The lessee commenced a well on a neighboring lease. A few days before the 
expiration of the primary term of the lease in question, the lessee executed a 
pooled unit including that lease in a unit with the well tract. The lessee did not 
record the unit designation until a few days after the expiration of the primary term. 
The well was completed as a gas well.
The Court held that the unit designation was not effective until it was filed for 
record in the county where the land was located. Since the primary term of the 
lease in question, covering the non-well tract, had come to an end before the unit 
designation was filed for record, there was no constructive drilling or production 
occurring with respect to that lease at the end of its primary term and, therefore, it 
had expired by its own terms.
VIII. POOLING MORE THAN ONCE
In the absence of a clause to the contrary, may the lessee exercise the 
pooling power more than once? Texaco, Inc. v. Letterman, 343 S.W.2d 726 
(Tex.Civ.App. 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.) held that a lessee could again pool the lease 
under the pooling clause after the prior unit had terminated. In this case, a portion 
of the acreage covered by the lease was initially pooled within a unit upon which a 
dry hole was drilled. The lessees thereafter dissolved the unit and pooled a 
different portion of the same lease within a subsequent unit. The unit well was
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located upon acreage covered by our lease. Later, the lessee pooled the 
remainder of the lease into a unit and drilled a well upon said unit which produced 
in paying quantities. The lessor asserted that the lessee could not take the lease 
out of the unit in the first instance and therefore the lessor must be paid on a lease 
basis, not a unit basis, for the well drilled on his acreage. The lessor additionally 
claimed that once the lessee had pooled the lease once, then subsequent attempts 
at pooling were invalid. The Texas Court held that the first unit, upon which the dry 
hole was drilled, had terminated as a matter of law. The Court held that for a 
pooled unit to exist, it must be made up of two or more leases which are in force 
and effect. Since all the other leases subject to the Unit Designation terminated of 
their own accord, the unit therefore could not survive.
Compare this case with Ladd Petroleum Corp. v. Eagle Oil & Gas Co., 699 
S.W.2d 99, (Tex. App., 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Two pooled tracts were held by a 
common lessee with a producing well on one of the tracts. The lessee mistakenly 
released the non-drillsite lease, took another one, and pooled the new lease in the 
same unit. Under Letterman, the old unit would have terminated. However, under 
Letterman, the unit well had ceased to produce. Here, there was continuous 
production so the facts apparently are distinct enough to justify a different result. 
What if the lessor under the drillsite had alleged termination? He didn't.
IX. SAVINGS CLAUSE
There has been a Texas case that also gave a restrictive reading to the 
pooling clause as to the time for its exercise in relation to a 60 day operations 
clause. Humble Oil and Refining Company v. Kunkle, 366 S.W.2d 236 
(Tex.Civ.App. 1963, writ ref'd, n.r.e.). The lease had a five year primary term, a 60 
day continuous drilling clause and a pooling clause. A well being drilled on the 
lease at the end of the primary term was completed as a dry hole after the end of 
the primary term. Fifty-six days after the dry hole, the lessee pooled the lease with 
other land on which there was a producing well. The lessor claimed the lease 
terminated. The Court agreed. The lease did not provide for pooling after the end 
of the primary term so it terminated by its own terms. The Court read the savings 
clause literally and because it did not s t a t e ". .  or on lands pooled therewith," they 
held that the exercise of the pooling rights were prohibited. Under modern day 
savings clauses, you can see that it does s t a t e ". .  or lands pooled therewith." I 
would say this case is probably a major reason for that.
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X. RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION OF POOLING CLAUSE
A line of cases in Texas has given a restrictive interpretation to the language 
contained in the pooling clause. In Jones v. Killingsworth, 403 S.W.2d 25 (Tex. 
1966), the pooling clause provided for pooling limits of 40 acres for oil and 640 
acres for gas, but further stated" . .  . provided that should governmental authority 
having jurisdiction prescribe or permit the creation of units larger than those 
specified, units thereafter created may conform substantially in size with those 
prescribed by governmental regulations." The lessee pooled for oil on 160 acres. 
The Railroad Commission permitted the 160 acre proration units but prescribed a 
minimum for such units as 80 acres. The Texas Supreme Court held that the 
pooling thus violated the area limitation of the pooling clause. This case is also 
widely cited for the axiom that the pooling clause will be construed strictly against 
the lessee.
XL GOOD FAITH POOLING
Most allegations of bad faith pooling arise where the lessee has apparently 
drawn the boundaries of the pooled unit to perpetuate as many leases as possible 
rather than to accomplish a permissible pooling goal. The question is generally 
treated as a question of fact for a jury to determine. An example of this is the case 
of Elliott v. Davis, 553 S.W.2d 223 (Tex.Civ.App. 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.) where the 
Court held that neither the lessee's pooling of the lease shortly before the end of the 
primary term nor the Railroad Commission's refusal to approve the acreage as a 
unit established bad faith of the lessee as a matter of law. Therefore, the question 
of what constitutes good faith is one of fact to be resolved by the fact finder.
An example of bad faith is Amoco Production Company v. Underwood, 558 
S.W.2d 509 (Tex.Civ.App. 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In this case, the lessee used the 
pooling clause to pool 553 acres of the drillsite lease with 135 acres of some seven 
other leases, thereby seeking to hold about 2,252 acres of leased land. Because 
the lease where the unit well was drilled contained 643 acres, it was unnecessary 
to pool with other acreage to have a full spacing unit and to receive the full 
allowable under the Railroad Commission's rules. At the time of trial, the lessee 
had no plans to drill further on the 2,253 acres sought to be held by the unit. The 
Court held (on a jury verdict which was affirmed) that this was not a good faith 
exercise of the pooling clause and set the pooling aside.
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The evidence which could be submitted to a jury to establish good faith or 
bad faith is the following:
1. Obvious gerrymandering of unit boundaries;
2. Express statements that they have been drawn to maintain leases;
3. Pooling an un-drilled tract just before the end of the primary term;
4. Testimony that the lessee did not consider geological factors in 
forming the unit;
5. The absence of plans for additional development;
6. The exclusion of productive acreage located near the well;
7. The inclusion of unproductive acreage or of acreage which is probably 
not within the well’s drainage pattern; and,
8. Rejection of the unit by the Railroad Commission.
On the other hand, of course, the lessee will testify with right hand upraised 
and solemn looks of truthfulness that the purpose of that unit was to prevent waste 
and promote conservation of hydrocarbons and that the inclusion of 47 tracts into 
a unit shaped like Idaho was merely a coincidence.
XII. CHANGING THE SIZE OF AN EXISTING POOLED UNIT
The cases and treatises have generally stated that the pooling authority 
granted in a lease is strictly construed, and only such authority as is specifically 
granted may be exercised by the Lessee. Grimes v. La Gloria Corp., 251 S.W.2d 
755 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952, no writ); Jones v. Killingsworth, supra; Oil and Gas Law, 
Williams & Meyers, Sections 980.4, 980.5; Pooling and Unitization, Raymond M. 
Meyers (1967) Sections 3.02 and 14.07; Voluntary Pooling and Unitization, Leo 
Hoffman (1954), Page 125, et seq.
The more recent case of Expando Production Co. v. Marshall, 407 S.W.2d 
254 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966, n.r.e.) holds, in effect, that absent anything in the lease 
pooling provisions preventing enlargement, and if the enlargement is not 
inconsistent with governmental regulations, such pooled unit may be enlarged only 
by the lessee, acting in the utmost good faith and, indeed, the lessee may be
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required to do so for the protection of the royalty owners. While this approach is far 
more preferable, Expando could be considered an anomaly since it stands virtually 
alone on these points.
I am satisfied that a persuasive argument can be advanced for either 
position, and because of the dearth of authority on the specific point, the issue 
cannot be clearly and unequivocally decided by the existing authority.
XIII. THE PUGH CLAUSE OR FREESTONE RIDER
It has historically been held that pooling only a portion of the lease, however 
small, within the unit preserves and perpetuates the entire lease. The only recourse 
of a lessor in this situation is the implied covenant of reasonable development. The 
results of suing under this covenant have not historically been kind to the lessor. 
Out of this gridlock grew the Pugh Clause, or the Freestone Rider, and for our 
purposes that clause will be defined as a lease clause, the purpose of which is to 
divide or segregate the lease into separately maintained parts when a portion of the 
lease is included in a unit. W e have attached as Exhibit “C" a “standard” freestone 
rider.
Generally speaking, Freestone Riders do not apply to tract wells even if they 
are declared as a pooled unit if no other leases or lands are actually pooled within 
said unit. Mathis v. Texas international Petroleum Corp., 627 F.Sup. 759 (W.D. 
Tex. 1986). You must always say generally, because there seem to be as many 
Freestone Riders around as there are stars in the sky.
The following clause was litigated in SMK Energy Corp. v. Westchester Gas 
Company, 705 S.W.2d 174 (Tex.App. 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
"Notwithstanding any provisions in this lease to the contrary, it is 
understood and agreed that this lease shall not (repeat not) extend 
beyond the primary term as to any part of the acreage described 
therein, excepting that part of the acreage which is then (at the end of 
the primary term) pooled or unitized for drilling, reworking operations, 
or production of oil and/or gas from such a unit or units then (at the 
end of the primary term) formed by LESSEE; and, as to that part of the 
acreage included within the boundaries of a unit or units so formed, 
such lease shall be perpetuated and continued only so long after the 
expiration of the primary term as production, drilling or reworking 
operation are continuously conducted thereon without interruption or 
cessation of more than ninety (90) days."
POOLING AND UNITIZATION IN TEXAS PAGE 9
SMK acquired a lease covering 203 acres which contained the above clause. 
Within the primary term they drilled and completed a producing well and committed 
40 acres of the lease to the proration unit surrounding the well. Westchester 
obtained a top lease of the acreage not within the 40 acre proration unit. This suit 
resulted. SMK argued that because no pooled unit was formed that the above 
clause was never triggered, thereby the entire lease was HBP. The Court held that 
the above rider was not a Pugh Clause, did not refer to the pooling provisions of the 
printed lease, and was in no way conditioned upon the exercise of the pooling rights 
granted by Paragraph 4 in said lease. The Court left open the question of what 
would have happened if Westchester had asserted a claim to the 40 acres 
committed to the well itself, but did hold that the remaining 163 acres were not 
"pooled or unitized" as provided in the rider at the end of the primary term.
Does a Freestone Rider result only in a vertical severance or is the 
severance both vertical and horizontal? In Frederick v. Amoco Production 
Company, 698 S.W.2d 748 (Tex.App. 1985, writ re f'd n.r.e.), the Freestone Rider 
was:
"In the event a portion or portions of the land herein leased is pooled 
or unitized with other land so as to form a pooled unit or units, 
operations on, completion of a well upon, or production from such unit 
or units will not maintain this lease in force as to the land not included 
in such unit or units. The lease may be maintained in force as to any 
land covered hereby and not included in such unit or units in any 
manner provided for herein; provided that if it be by rental payments, 
rentals shall be reduced in proportion to the number of acres covered 
hereby and included in such unit or units. If at or after the end of the 
primary term, this lease is being maintained as to a part of the lands 
by operations on, completion of a well upon, or production from a 
pooled unit or units embracing lands covered hereby and other land, 
and if at such time there be land covered hereby which is not situated 
in such unit or units and as to which the lease is not being maintained 
by operations, completion of a well, or production, Lessee shall have 
the right to maintain the lease as to such land by rental payments 
exactly as if it were during the primary term, provided that this lease 
may not be so maintained in force by rental payments more than three 
(3) years beyond the end of the primary term."
The facts of the case are relatively simple. Two adjoining leases, one 
covering 200 acres and the other covering 120 acres, were pooled to form a 320 
acre unit as to rights from the surface to 1,298 feet. A gas well was then drilled
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and shut-in gas royalty timely paid. The controversy centered upon the rights below 
1,298 feet in the 320 acres. The lessors argued that the Freestone Rider, when 
read in conjunction with the unit, effectuated a termination as to all of those deep 
rights in the 320 acres. The Court of Appeals found that if the parties had intended 
horizontal severance, then the lease clause in question would have so provided. 
The Court held that all rights and depths within the unit were maintained by 
production from the unit. Generally, in the case of the Freestone Rider referenced 
above, if the lessee had drilled a well upon the lease and not pooled any portion 
thereof with other lands and leases, all of the lease would still be maintained by 
production, even though all of the lands covered by said lease were not included 
within the proration unit filed with the Railroad Commission for allowable purposes. 
This is because the Freestone Rider itself states that the lease may be maintained 
as otherwise set forth therein. Some Freestone Riders do specifically include 
proration units within the ambit of their coverage and, in such an instance, the lands 
covered by said lease not within the proration unit would expire absent operations 
or other production from the remaining portions of said lease. Each Freestone 
Rider will stand on its own and should be read carefully. Never assume that they 
don't apply to proration units. If it is ambiguous, follow the guidelines of Jones, 
supra: pooling authority will be construed strictly.
The case of Parten v. Cannon, 829 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. Civ. App. 1992, writ 
denied) construed a lease containing the following provision (only partially 
reproduced):
"Lessee must within ninety (90) days after the end of the primary term 
of this lease as to the leased premises which is not pooled under the 
provisions of Paragraph 4 hereof, designate in writing and place same 
of record with the County Clerk in Madison County, Texas, a 
description of that part of the leased premises which shall be allotted 
to such well for production purposes,..." and
"...Production or operations on said allotted area by the Lessee shall 
maintain this lease in effect only with regard to the land within the 
described area. This lease shall terminate as to such part or parts of 
the leased land lying outside the allotted area...".
It is undisputed that the Partens never recorded a written designation 
allocating any portion of the lease to producing wells at the end of the primary term. 
However, it is also undisputed that five wells were producing in paying quantities as 
of the end of the primary term; and that six additional wells were completed 
between 1981 and October, 1986. The threshold question the Court considered
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was whether the above provisions were a covenant or a condition. The Court 
essentially held the production and allotment provision was a condition, breach of 
which resulted in automatic termination of the leasehold estate upon the happening 
of the stipulated events. They held that the designation and filing provision was 
essentially a covenant, and that the lessees would have ten days to satisfy their 
obligations in accordance with Paragraph 9 of the lease. Therefore, no automatic 
termination of the lease resulted from a breach of that provision. The Court then 
partially remanded the case to the jury for determination of what acreage was lost 
because of the breach of the production and allotment provision.
XIV. THE CROSS-CONVEYANCE THEORY
Texas follows the "cross-conveyancing” theory when determining the 
relationship of parties to a pooling or unitization. Veal v. Thomason, 159 S.W.2d 
472 (Tex., 1942). In this case, numerous owners of mineral estates and various 
tracts of land executed a community lease or joint lease to the Texas Company. 
The lease provided for an apportionment of royalties for production located 
anywhere within the boundaries of the community lease. Thomason questioned 
title to Tract 68 and sued Veal for the mineral title and the Texas Company for the 
working interest as to said Tract 68. The Court held that all of the lessors in the 
community lease were joint owners, or joint tenants, of all royalties reserved therein, 
the ownership being in proportion which the acreage of each lease bears to the 
total acreage of the unitized block. You may ask, what were the ramifications of this 
decision? The Court held that each party to the 6,000 acre community lease was 
a necessary party and gave Thomason time to serve all of them with process. You 
can imagine what he would have had to do. The Court's inference in this case that 
the royalty in the community lease was cross conveyed has been extended to 
include all parties to a pooling or unitization agreement. Texaco, Inc. v. Letterman, 
supra.
Further extensions have been made with regard to division orders, Pan 
American Petroleum Corp. v. Vines, 459 S.W.2d 911 (Tex.Civ.App. 1970, writ ref'd, 
n.r.e.). In this case, the owner of a royalty interest bought an action against the gas 
unit operator to construe the terms of the division order that he had signed. All of 
the other royalty owners within the unit had signed an identical division order. The 
lessee argued that the non-joined parties who executed these division orders were 
indispensable parties. The Court concluded that a construction of the division order 
would in reality be a construction of all the other division orders, and therefore the 
non-joined parties were indispensable. The first Texas case extending the cross- 
conveyance doctrine to a pooling agreement was Miles v. Amaretta Petroleum 
Corp., 241 S.W.2d 822 (Tex.Civ.App. 1950, writ ref'd n.r.e.). However, the cross-
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conveyancing theory has not been extended to joint operating agreements, Atlantic 
Richfield Company v. Exxon Corp., 678 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. 1984). The Court of 
Appeals basically stated that the contracts in question did not evidence an intent 
to cross-convey the gas reserves.
XV. TERMINATION OF UNITS
When does a unit terminate? Obviously, a unit agreement may expressly 
provide when a unit will cease to have effect. The parties can agree to terminate 
a pooling or unitization by dissolution so long as all who are affected by the pooling 
agree to such termination. We've already seen circumstances (Letterman) where 
they terminate by operation of law.
XVI. PROBLEMS OF UNSIGNED, NON-POOLED OR NON-UNITIZED 
TRACTS OR INTERESTS
It is apparent that no unleased mineral owner or other non-executive interest 
owner can have their interest pooled or unitized without their express consent. The 
ramifications accruing to this basic doctrine are very distinct when applied to drillsite 
and non-drillsite tracts. In Texas, "if there is no production from the tract in 
question, the uncommitted royalty interest, in the absence of equitable 
considerations, receives nothing even though there is production elsewhere in the 
unit.” Superior Oil Company v. Roberts, 398 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. 1966).
If working interest owners have voluntarily pooled their interests in a unit, can 
a lessee who was not offered the opportunity to pool, ratify the unit and thereafter 
be a participant in the unit well(s) without the consent of the other working interest 
owners? The case of Fletcher v. Ricks Exploration, 905 Fed 2nd 890 (5th Circuit, 
1990) attempted to answer this question. In this case, Ricks, and several other 
lessees, filed a Unit Designation which pooled the royalty and working interest of 
those who either signed or ratified the agreement. The area within the designation 
included the 30 acre tract leased to Fletcher. Fletcher was never informed of the 
pooling agreement. After learning of the Unit Designation, Fletcher attempted to 
ratify the agreement. In the interim, however, the Railroad Commission had 
determined that the 30 acre tract leased to Fletcher was non-productive acreage. 
Proceeds from the Ricks well were distributed to all signatory parties, including 
those who owned interests in the remaining 1/2 minerals in the 30 acre tract. 
Fletcher argued that the filing of the Unit Designation and the signing of the pooling 
agreement was an offer for all mineral owners within the specified area to join. 
Therefore, his ratification was an acceptance of the offer. This circuit rejected this 
offer and acceptance theory. The Court basically held that Fletcher was not a c o - 
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tenant under these facts. We question the accuracy of this analogy but we do 
agree with the result.
XVII. NON-PARTICIPATING ROYALTY OWNERS (NPRI)
The non-participating royalty interest owner generally owns a non-cost 
bearing interest in gross production carved out of the mineral estate. Generally, 
they don't have the right to participate in the execution of oil, gas and mineral 
leases. The party who does own the right is called the executive holder. Obviously, 
the non-participating royalty interest owner is dependent upon the executive in the 
execution of the lease, especially when they own a percentage of the royalty 
provided for in the lease. The duty owed by the executive to the non-executive 
could be the basis of another seminar but generally they owe a duty of good faith 
and utmost fair dealing.
For our purposes, we are going to concentrate on the pooling of non- 
participating royalty interests. It is obvious in Texas that without the consent of the 
non-participating royalty interest owner, the owner of the executive right does not 
have the power to authorize the pooling of his interest. Montgomery v. 
Rittersbacher, 424 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. 1968). If there is just one tract on the lease, 
then the decision by the non-participating royalty owner is simple. If the well is 
located on that tract, then he is entitled to his share of the well, if the well is on 
another tract, and the non-participating royalty interest tract is pooled therewith, 
then he can ratify the lease and share in production on a unit basis. When the 
executive owner executes a lease covering separate tracts with different royalty 
ownership, the Courts have held that this basically amounts to an offer by the owner 
of the executive right to the lessee and the non-participating royalty interest owner 
to create a community lease and to pool or unitize all of the royalties in all of the 
tracts covered by the lease. The ratification of such a lease by the non-participating 
royalty interest owner enables the non-participating royalty interest owner to share 
in the production from a well located on a lease tract other than the non- 
participating royalty interest owner's tract, Ruiz v. Martin, 559 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. Civ. 
App., 1977, writ ref d n.r.e.), and also from a well located on an outside tract pooled 
with a tract covered by the same lease which covers the non-participating royalty 
interest owner’s tract. (See Montgomery, supra).
Even if the lease contains an “anti-entireties” clause, the Courts have allowed 
the non-drillsite non-participating royalty interest owner to ratify the lease and 
receive an allocable share of production based on the offer to pool theory. London 
v. Merriman, 756 S.W.2d 736. (Tex. Civ. App. 1988, writ den'd) and Verble v. 
Coffman, 680 S.W.2d 59 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984, no writ). The non-participating
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royalty interest owner can wait until the well is successfully completed before 
deciding whether to ratify the lease, and obviously he can also refuse ratification. 
In one case, MCZ, Inc. v. Triolo, 708 S.W.2d 48 (Tex. Civ. App. 1986, writ ref'd 
n.r.e.), the non-participating royalty interest owner was allowed to ratify one pooled 
unit which included his interest in a non-drillsite tract and then later refused to ratify 
another unit which included his interest in a drillsite tract I don't trust that case. A 
non-participating royalty interest owner does have to ratify within a reasonable time, 
or he will be estopped to claim the benefits of pooling. Nugent v. Freeman, 306 
S.W.2d 167 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
In most cases, the ratification will be effective on the date of execution, but 
in one case, De Benavides v. Warren, 674 S.W.2d 353, 360 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984, 
writ ref'd n.r.e.), a non-participating royalty interest owner ratified a lease, and it was 
deemed to be retroactive to the date of creation and designation of the unit. Again, 
the relationship of non-participating royalty interest to pooling could be a seminar 
in and of itself, and the above is merely a highlight of the most pertinent aspects of 
that relationship.
XVIII. ESTOPPEL
What about estoppel to challenge improperly formed units? It has been held 
that acceptance by royalty owners of royalty payments from unit production with full 
knowledge that they were in payment for royalty from a unit well, and that the unit 
well included their land and other lands which had been unitized, constituted a 
ratification of the unit, and therefore said royalty owners were estopped to later 
challenge the validity of the unit. Leopard v. Stanolind Oil and Gas Company, 220 
S.W.2d 259 (Tex.Civ.App. 1949, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Sometimes this case has been 
cited as standing for the proposition that a lessor who has executed a division order 
which clearly identifies his lands as being including in a pooled unit and accepts the 
benefit of that unit will be estopped to challenge the validity of the unit. As all of you 
know, however, the ability to rely upon division orders has been drastically eroded 
in other areas, and we certainly don't recommend blind faith in this regard.
Estoppel did not work in the case of Hunt Oil Company v. Moore, 656 S.W.2d 
634 (Tex.Civ.App. 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The lease in this case mandated a 
maximum of 40 acre oil units. The Railroad Commission prescribed 80 acre field 
rules but permitted 160 acre units. The lease, covering 92 acres, was pooled into 
two 160 acre units. Neither of the unit wells was located on the lease. The Court 
applied Jones, supra, to this case, and held that the lessee did not have the power 
to pool this lease into 160 acre units and the lease therefore terminated. The
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lessee relied upon the following actions of the royalty owners as a ratification and 
estoppel defense:
1. Execution of separate division orders for each unit; and
2. Cashing of checks representing proceeds from each unit.
The Court held that because the actions occurred after the termination of the 
lease, the actions would have no effect on said lease. There were other procedural 
matters involved in the disposition of this case which may render it questionable for 
precedent value but the lesson here is not to rely upon estoppel unless all else fails.
XIX. HORIZONTAL WELLS
The first thing to remember with regard to these up-and-coming wells is that 
every tract penetrated by the wellbore has many of the legal characteristics of the 
drillsite in a conventional vertical unit. That means that every tract which could be 
penetrated by that wellbore had better be examined in the same manner and on the 
same basis as your drillsite in a conventional vertical unit.
XX. UNIT SIZE
Typical horizontal field rules base production allowable upon surface acreage 
and permit additional acreage per well for increased "horizontal displacement". A  
typical lease form, at least the one in front of you, will conform somewhat to a 
horizontal situation because of the "prescribed or permitted" language in the lease. 
However, if it's an older HBP form lease, remember the trap in Jones, supra, where 
“prescribed” was interpreted so as not to allow a unit of an optional larger size 
permitted under the applicable field rules.
What about the dilemma regarding production while drilling? Ideally, 
horizontal units should be pooled effective as of the time the bit enters the 
productive formation; however, the final unit configuration won't be known until 
horizontal drilling within the formation is completed. This problem should be 
addressed by drafting a pooling clause to make units effective as of the date of first 
production while allowing units to be reformed after completion of the well if the 
horizontal displacement differs from that anticipated. Where you've got to "make 
do" with a conventional pooling clause, one solution is to file a unit designation prior 
to the commencement of the horizontal phase of drilling and include a provision in 
the unit that the unit can be amended after completion of the well if the horizontal 
displacement differs substantially from that anticipated and such amendment will
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relate back to the date of first production. I haven't seen this tested in a reported 
case other than discussed above with regard to vertical pooling, but it certainly 
beats not trying.
XXI. AMENDING OLD UNITS
Let's say there is a vertical well and you feel like you can cut a window in the 
casing and then dig your well horizontally as discussed above. This presents a 
problem because the existing well is still producing and located on a pooled unit but 
a substantially larger pooled unit will be required for the horizontal re-entry. What's 
going to happen if you want to dissolve the existing unit and form a larger unit that 
will be required for a horizontal re-completion? This particular situation, to my 
knowledge, has not been litigated. You really don't have a drafting opportunity 
because you're dealing with a pre-existing lease, and the older the lease, the less 
flexibility the lessee is going to have. Probably the fail-safe approach is to get all 
royalty and mineral owners in the existing unit to either amend the lease with a new 
pooling clause containing horizontal latitude or obtain their signature on the 
horizontal unit itself.
XXII. ALLOCATION FORMULAS
As noted above, it seems that these horizontal units are still utilizing the 
traditional surface acre tract allocation formula for distributing production. This is 
required in our pooling clause. If done properly, a clause in the lease could base 
allocation on the length of the borehole under tracts in the unit.
What happens if you do trespass and how do you determine how much 
production occurred from the trespassed tract? The general rule is that one who 
wrongfully permits the property of another to become so intermingled and confused 
with his own property so as to render it impossible as to identify the goods of each 
is under the burden of disclosing such facts as will ensure a fair division. Humble 
Oil and Refining Company v. West, 508  S.W .2d 812(Tex. 1974), appeal on remand 
543 S.W.2d 667 (Tex.Civ.App. 1976, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875). If the co-mingling 
party fails or refuses to meet this burden, the combined property or its value will be 
awarded to the injured party. Stated another way, a lessee who willfully co-mingles 
oil from various properties will be held to a strict requirement of allocating the 
production of the various properties and upon failure to show a proper allocation, 
the lessee must account on the entire co-mingled production. If the evidence 
establishes a reasonably certain estimate, then it will be divided on that estimated 
basis. The more the evidence indicates that the co-mingling is not willful, then the 
more latitude is allowed the person responsible for co-mingling.
POOLING AND UNITIZATION IN TEXAS PAGE 17
My brother, Bob, recently tried a case in Fayette County, Texas, regarding 
the establishment of a unit for a horizontal well. The trial Court determined that the 
lessees had violated the pooling provisions in the leases, rendering the pooled units 
invalid, and the jury awarded the lessors $833,256, plus pre- and post-judgment 
interest and attorneys’ fees. The Appellate Court has wisely remanded the case for 
a re-determination of damages. No. 03-98-00638-CV, Browning Oil Company, Inc. 
and Marathon Oil Company v. Jimmie M. Luecke and Leona M. Luecke, Texas 
Court of Appeals, Third District, Austin. The appellees have filed a motion for 
rehearing.
In discussing the proper amount of damages, the Appellate Court noted that 
the Lueckes had contracted for a share in royalties based on total production from 
their land (Court’s emphasis). The jury charge in the trial Court, according to the 
opinion, allowed and perhaps encouraged the jury to award the Lueckes royalties 
on oil and gas produced from lands the Lueckes did not own.
Probably the most interesting aspect of this case involves the Appellate 
Court’s recognition of the public benefit of horizontal drilling and its application to 
the proper quantum of damages. The Appellate Court stated:
“On the other hand, we recognize the immense benefits that have 
accompanied the advent of horizontal drilling, including the reduction 
of waste and the more efficient recovery of hydrocarbons. Draconian 
punitive damages for a lessee’s failure to comply with applicable 
pooling provisions could result in the curtailment of horizontal drilling.
We decline to apply legal principles appropriate to vertical wells that 
are so blatantly inappropriate to horizontal wells and would discourage 
the use of this promising technology. The better remedy is to allow the 
offended lessors to recover royalties as specified in the lease, 
compelling a determination of what production can be attributed to 
their tracts with reasonable probability. See Ortiz Oil Co. v. Luttes, 141 
S.W.2d 1050, 1053 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1940, writ dism’d by 
agr.) (fact that exact amount of oil produced cannot be precisely 
determined is no reason for denying recovery based on jury’s 
approximation). The Lueckes are entitled to the royalties for which they 
contracted, no more and no less.”
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O IL , GAS A N D  M IN E R A L  LEASE
THIS AGREEMENT made th is_____________________________ day of _________________________________________________________ 19____, between
Lessor (whether one or more), whose address is: _________ _
an d _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________Lessee. WITNESSETH:
I. Lessor in consideration of _ ____  Dollars
($___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ). in hand paid, of the royalties herein provided, and of the agreements o f  Lessee herein contained, hereby grants, leases and lets exclusively
unto Lessee for the purpose of investigating, exploring, prospecting, drilling and mining for and producing oil, gas and all other minerals, conducting exploration, 
geologic and geophysical surveys by seismograph, core test, gravity and magnetic methods, injecting gas. water and other fluids, and air into subsurface strata, laying 
pipe lines, building roads, tanks, power stations, telephone lines and other structures thereon and on, over and across lands owned or claimed by Lessor adjacent and 
contiguous thereto, to produce, save, take care of. treat, transport and own said products, and housing its employees, the following described land in _______________
---------  ----------------------------------------------------------- County,Texas, to-wit:
Exhibit “A"
This lease also covers and includes all land owned or claimed by Lessor adjacent or contiguous to the land particularly described above, whether the same be in said 
survey or surveys or in adjacent surveys, although not included within the boundaries of the land particularly described above.
2. This is a paid up lease and subject to the other provisions herein contained, this lease shall be for a term of years from this date (called "primary term” ) 
and as long thereafter as oil, gas or other mineral is produced from said land or land with which said land is pooled thereunder.
3. As royalty, lessee covenants and agrees: (a) To deliver to the credit of lessor, in the pipe line to which lessee may connect i ts wells, the equal one-eighth part of 
all oil produced and saved by lessee from said land, or from time to time, at the option of lessee, to pay lessor the average posted market price of such one-eighth part of 
such oil at the wells as o f the day it is run to the pipe line or storage tanks, lessor's interest, in either case, to bear one-eighth of the cost of treating oil to render it 
marketable pipe line oil; (b) to pay lessor for gas and casinghead gas produced from said land (1) when so ld by lessee, one-eighth of the amount realized by lessee, com- 
puted at the mouth of the well, or (2) when used by lessee off said land or in the manufacture of gasoline or other products, one-eighth of the amount rallied  from the 
sale of gasoline or other products extracted therefrom and one-eighth of the amount realized from the sale of residue gas after deducting the amount used for plant fuel 
and/ or compression: (c) To pay lessor on all other minerals mined and marketed or utilised by lessee from said land, one-tenth either in kind or value at the well or mine 
at lessee's election, except that on sulphur mined and marketed the royalty shall be one dollar ($1.00) per long ton. If. at the expiration of the primary term or at any 
lime or times thereafter, there is any well on said land or on lands with which said land or any portion thereof has been pooled, capable of producing oil or gas. and ail 
such wells are shut-in. this lease shall, nevertheless, continue in force as though operations were being conducted on said land for so long as said wells are shut-in, and 
thereafter this lease may be continued in force as if no shut-in had occurred. Lessee coavenants and agrees to use reasonable diligence to produce, utilize, or market the 
minerals capable of being produced from said wells, but in the exercise of such diligence, lessee shall not be obligated to install or furnish facilities other than well 
facilities and ordinary lease facilities of flow lines, separator, and lease tank, and shall not be required to settle labor trouble or to market gas upon terms unacceptable 
to lessee. If, at any time or times after the expiration of the primary term, all such wells are shut-in for a period of ninety consecutive days, and during such lime there 
are no operations on said land, then at or before the expiration of said ninety day period, lessee shall pay or tender, by check or draft of lessee, as royalty, a sum equal 
to one dollar (SI .00) for each acre of land then covered hereby. Lessee shall make like payments or tenders at or before the end of each anniversary of the expiration of 
said ninety day period if upon such anniversary this lease is being continued in force solely by reason of the provisions o f this paragraph. Each such payment or tender 
shall be made to the parties who at the time of payment would be entitled to receive the royalties which would be paid under this lease if the wells were producing, and
may be deposited in the Bank at
_______________________________ , or its successors, which shall continue as the depositories, regardless of changes in the ownership of shut-in royalty. If at any time
that lessee pays or tenders shut-in royalty, two or more parties are. or claim to be, entitled to receive same, lessee may. in lieu of any other method of payment herein 
provided, pay or tender such shut-in royalty, in the manner above specified, either jointly to such parties or separately to each in accordance with their respective owner-
ships thereof, as lessee may elect. Any payment hereunder may be made by check or draft of lessee deposited in the mail or delivered to the party entitled to receive pay-
ment or to  a depository bank provided for above on or before the last date for payment. Nothing herein shall impair lessee's right to re la te  as provided in paragraph 5 
hereof. In the event of assignment of this lease in whole or in part, liability for payment hereunder shall rest exclusively on the then owners of this lease, severally as to 
acreage owned by each.
4. Lessee, at its option, is hereby given the right and power to pool or combine the acreage covered by this lease or any portion thereof as to oil and gas, or either 
of them, with any other land covered by this lease, and/or with any other land, lease or leases in the immediate vicinity thereof to the extent hereinafter stipulated, when 
in Lessee's judgment it is necessary or advisable to do so in order properly to explore, or to develop and operate said leased premises in compliance with the spacing 
rules of the Railroad Commission of Texas, or other lawful authority, or when to do so would, in the judgment of Lessee, promote the conservation of oil and gas in 
and under and that may be produced from said premises. Units pooled for oil hereunder shall not substantially exceed 40 acres each in area, and units pooled for gas 
hereunder shall not substantially exceed in area  640 acres ea c h  plus a tolerance o f ten percent (10%) thereof, provided that should governmental authority having 
jurisdiction prescribe or permit the creation of units larger than those specified, for the drilling or operation of a well at a regular location or for obtaining maximum 
allowable from any well to be drilled, drilling or already drilled, units thereafter cra ted  may conform substantially in size with those prescribed or permitted by govern-
mental regulations. Lessee under the provisions hereof may pool or combine acreage covered by this lease or any portion thereof as above provided as to oil in any one 
or more strata and as to gas in any one or more strata. The units formed by pooling as to any stratum or strata need not conform in size or area  with the unit or units in-
to which the lea s e  is pooled or combined as to any other stratum or strata, and oil units need not conform as to area  with gas units. The pooling in one or more instances 
shall not exhaust the rights of the Lessee hereunder to pool this lease or portions thereof into other units. Lessee shall file for record in the appropriate records of the 
county in which the leased premises are situated an instrument describing and designating the pooled acreage as a pooled unit; and upon such recordation the unit shall 
be effective as to all parties hereto, their heirs, successors, and assigns, irrespective of whether or not the unit is likewise effective as to all other owners of surface, 
mineral, royalty, or other rights in land included in such unit. Lessee may at its election exercise its pooling option before or after commencing operations for or com-
pleting an oil or gas well on the leased premises, and the pooled unit may include, but it is not required to include, land or leases upon which a well capable of producing 
oil or gas in paying quantities has theretofore been completed or upon which operations for the drilling of a well for oil or gas have theretofore been commenced. In the 
event of operations for drilling on or production of oil or gas from any part of a pooled unit which includes all or a portion of the land covered by this lease, regardless 
of whether such operations for drilling were commenced or such production was secured before or after the execution of this instrument or the instrument designating 
the pooled unit, such operations shall be considered as operations for  drilling on or production of oil or gas from land covered by this lease whether or not the well or 
wells be located on the premises covered by this lea s e  and in such event operations for drilling shall be deemed to have been commenced on said land within the meaning 
of paragraph $ of this lease; and (he entire acreage constituting such unit or units, as to oil and gas, or either of them, as herein provided, shall be treated for all pur-
poses. except the payment of royalties on production from the pooled unit, as if the same were included in this lease. For the purpose of computing the royalties to 
which owners of royalties and payments out of production and each of them shall be entitled on production of oil and gas. or either of them, from the pooled unit, there 
shall be allocated to the land covered by this lease and included in said unit (or to each separate tract within the unit if this lease covers separate tracts within the unit) a 
pro rata portion of the oil and gas. or either of them, produced from the pooled unit after deducting that used for operations on the pooled unit. Such allocation shall be 
on an acreage basis—that is to say, there shall be allocated to the acreage covered by this lease and included in the pooled unit (or to each separate tract within the unit if 
this lease covers separate tracts within the unit) that pro rata portion o f the oil and gas. or either of them, produced from the pooled unit which the number of surface 
acres covered by this lease (or in each such separate tract) and included in the pooled unit bears to the total number of surface acres included in the pooled unit. 
Royalties hereunder shall be computed on the portion of such production, whether it be oil and gas. or either of them, so allocated to the land covered by this lease and 
included in the unit just as though such production were from such land. The production from an oil well will be considered as production from the lease or oil pooled 
unit from which it is producing and not as production from a gas pooled unit; and production from a gas well will be considered as production from the lease or gas 
pooled unit from which it is producing and not from an oil pooled unit. The formation of any unit hereunder shall not have the effect of changing the ownership of any 
shut-in production royalty which may become payable under this lease. If this lease now or hereafter covers separate tracts, no pooling or unitization of royally interest 
as between any such separate tracts is intended or shall be implied or result merely from the inclusion of such separate tracts within this lease but Lessee shall never-
theless have the right to pool as provided above with consequent allocation of production as above provided. As used in this paragraph 4, the words “ separate tract” 
m an  any tract with royalty ownership differing, now or hereafter, either as to parties or amounts, from that as to any other part of the leased premises.
3. If at the expiration of the primary term, oil, gas, or other mineral is not being produced on laid land, or from land pooled therewith, but Lessee is then 
engaged in drilling or reworking operations thereon, or shall have completed a dry hole thereon within 60 days prior to the end of the primary term, the lease shall 
remain in force so long as operations on said well or for drilling or reworking o f any additional well are prosecuted with no cessation of mote than 60 consecutive days 
and if they result in the production of oil. gas or other mineral, so long thereafter as oil, gas, or other mineral it produced from said land, or from land pooled 
therewith. If, after the expiration of the primary term of this lease and after oil. gas. or other mineral is produced from said land, or from land pooled therewith, the 
production thereof should cease from any cause, this lease shall not terminate if Lessee commences operations for drilling or reworking within 60 days after the 
cessation of such production, but shall remain in force and effect so long as such operations are prosecuted with no cessation of more than 60 consecutive days, and if 
they result in the production of oil. gas. or other mineral, so long thereafter as oil, gas, or other mineral is produced from said land, or from land pooled therewith. Any 
pooled unit designated by Lessee in accordance with the terms hereof, may be dissolved by Lessee by instrument filed for record in the appropriate records of the county 
in which the leased premises are situated at any time after the completion of a dry hole or the cessation of production on said unit. In the event a well or wells producing 
oil or gas in paying quantities should be brought in on adjacent land and within 330 feet of and draining the leased premises, or land pooled therewith. Lessee agrees to 
drill such offset well or wells as a reasonably prudent operator would drill under the same or similar circumstances. Lessee may at any time execute and deliver to Lessor 
or place of record a release or releases covering any portion or portions of the above described premises and thereby surrender this lease as to such portion or por tions 
and be relieved of all obligations as to  the acreage surrendered.
6. Lessee shall have the right at any time during or after the expiration o f this lease to remove all property and fixtures placed by Lessee on said land, including 
the right to draw and remove all casing. When required by Lessor. Lessee will bury all pipe lines below ordinary plow depth, and no well shall be drilled within two hun-
dred (200) feet of any residence or barn now on said land without Lessor's consent.
7. The rights of either party hereunder may be assigned in whole or in part, and the provisions hereof shall extend to their heirs, successors and assigns: but no 
change or division in ownership o f the land, or royalties, however accomplished, shall operate to enlarge the obligations or diminish the rights of Lessee; and no change 
or division in such ownership shall be binding on Lessee until thirty (30) days after Lessee shall have been furnished by registered U.S. mail at Lessee's principal place of 
business with a certified copy o f recorded instrument or instruments evidencing same. In the event of assignment hereof in whole or in part, liability for breach of any 
obligation hereunder shall rest exclusively upon the owner o f this lease or o f a portion thereof who commits such breach. If six or more parties become entitled to 
royally hereunder. Lessee may withhold payment thereof unless and until furnished with a recordable instrument executed by all such parties designating an agent to 
receive payment for all.
t. The breach by Lessee o f any obligation arising hereunder shall not work a forfeiture or termination of this lease nor cause a termination or reversion of the 
estate created hereby nor be grounds for cancellation hereof in whole or in part. No obligation reasonably to develop the leased premises shall arise during the primary 
term. Should oil. gas or other mineral in paying quantities be discovered on said premises, then after the expiration of the primary term. Lessee shall develop the 
acreage retained hereunder as a reasonably prudent operator, but in discharging this obligation it shall in no event be required to drill more than one well per forty (40) 
acres of the area retained hereunder and capable of producing oil in paying quantities and one well per 640 acres plus an acreage tolerance not to  exceed 10% of 640 
acres of the area retained hereunder and capable o f producing gas or other mineral in paying quantities. If after the expiration of the primary term. Lessor considers 
that operations are not at any time being conducted in compliance with this lease. Lessor shall notify Lessee in writing of the facts relied upon as constituting a breach 
hereof, and Lessee, if in default, shall have sixty days after receipt of such notice in which to commence the compliance with the obligations imposed by virtue of this in-
strument
9.  Lessor hereby warrants and agrees to defend the title to said land and agrees that Lessee at its option may discharge any tax. mortgage or other lien upon Mid 
land, either in whole or in part, and in event Lessee does so, it shall be subrogated to such lien with right to  enforce same and apply royalties accruing hereunder toward 
satisfying same. Without impairment of Lessee’s rights under the warranty in event of failure of title, it is agreed that if this lease covers a less interest in the oil. gas. 
sulphur, or other minerals in all or any part of said land than the entire and undivided fee simple estate (whether Lessor's interest is herein specified or not), or no in- 
terest therein, then the royalties, and other monies accruing from any part as to which this lease covers less than such full interest, shall be paid only in the proportion 
which the interest therein, if any, covered by this lease, bears to the whole and undivided fee simple estate therein. All royalty interest covered by this lease (whether or 
not owned by Lessor) shall be paid out of the royalty herein provided. Should any one or more of the parties named above as Lessors fail to execute this lease, it shall 
nevertheless be binding upon the party or parties executing the same.
10. Should Lessee be prevented from complying with any express or implied covenant of this lease, from conducting drilling or reworking operations thereon or 
from producing oil or gas therefrom by reason of scarcity of or inability to obtain or to use equipment or material, or by operation of force majeure, and Federal or 
state law or any order, rule or regulation of governmental authority, then while so prevented. Lessee's obligation to comply with such covenant shall be suspended, 
and Lessee shall not be liable in damages for failure to comply therewith; and this lease shall be extended while and so long as Lessee is prevented by any such cause 
from conducting drilling or reworking operations on or from producing oil or gas from the lease premises; and the time while Lessee is so prevented shall not be counted 
against Lessee, anything in this lease to the contrary not withstanding.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this instrument is executed on  the date first above written.
STATE OF _________________________________  INDIVIDUAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT
COUNTY OF________________________________
Before me, the undersigned authority, on this day personally appeared . . ....................
known to me to be the person____whose name____ is (are) subscribed to the foregoing instrument, and acknowledged to me th a t------------------------------------------------
executed the same as___________ free act and deed for the purposes and consideration therein expressed.
Given under my hand and seal of office this________day o f . 19------ •
My Commission Expires 
Notary's Personal Name
STATE OF__________________________________
_____  HUSBAND AND WIFE ACKNOWLEDGMENT
COUNTY O F ------------------------------------------------
Before me, the undersigned authority, on this day personally appeared  --------------------------------- — -— —  -----------------------------------------------------------------
husband and wife, known to me to be the persons whose names are subscribed to the forgoing instrument, and acknowledged to me that they executed the same as their 
free act and deed tor the purposes and consideration therein expressed.
Given under my hand and seal of office th is----------- day o f , 19 ------
My Commission Expires Notary Public in a nd for the State of Texas
Notary's Printed Name
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Exhibit “B"
UNIT DESIGNATION  
NO DRY HOLE GAS UNIT NO. 1 
SMITH COUNTY, TEXAS
STATE OF TEXAS §
§ KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: THAT
COUNTY OF SMITH §
WHEREAS, HOPING FOR EXPLORATION COMPANY (hereinafter called 
"Lessee") is the present owner and holder of the oil, gas and mineral leases 
(hereinafter collectively referred to as "Said Leases"), identified and described on 
Exhibit "A" which is attached hereto and made a part hereof for all purposes, insofar 
as Said Leases cover the lands included within the hereinafter described unit; and
WHEREAS, each of Said Leases, as amended, provide that the Lessee shall 
have the right and power to designate, pool or combine, as to the gas rights therein 
and thereunder, the acreage covered thereby, or portions thereof, with other land, 
lease, or leases in the immediate vicinity thereof, in order to form a gas unit or units 
of the size and type hereinafter described, provided that the Lessee shall execute 
an instrument in writing identifying and describing such acreage; and
WHEREAS, in the judgment of Lessee it is necessary and advisable to 
designate Said Leases and to pool and combine Said Leases, insofar as they cover 
the lands included in the said unit, in order to properly develop and operate the 
premises for the production of gas, and in order to promote the conservation of gas 
in, under and that may be produced from said unitized premises;
NOW, THEREFORE, the Lessee, acting under and by virtue of the power 
and authority conferred and granted by the provisions of the oil, gas and mineral 
leases, as amended, described in said Exhibit "A", does hereby designate, pool and 
combine Said Leases into a unit designated as the No Dry Hole Gas Unit No. 1, 
containing 690.129 acres of land, more or less, being the land within the dashed 
outline on Plat marked Exhibit “B" and described by reference on Exhibit “C”, said 
exhibits attached hereto and made a part hereof, for the purpose of developing and 
operating the lands and leases for the production, storage, processing, and
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marketing of gas and gas rights, all as provided for in and authorized by Said 
Leases as amended. It is the intent to designate and pool all leases owned by 
Lessee covering said lands, regardless of whether said leases are listed on Exhibit 
"A".
This unit may be dissolved by the Lessee, its successors or assigns, by 
instrument filed for record in the appropriate records of Smith County, Texas, at any 
time after the cessation of production on said unit. Lessee reserves the right to 
amend this unit.
This instrument is signed by the Lessee on the date its signature is 
acknowledged, but it is understood and agreed that same shall be effective as of 
the date of first production.
HOPING FOR EXPLORATION COMPANY
By:____________________________________
Title:__________________________________
STATE OF TEXAS §
COUNTY OF SMITH §
This instrument was acknowledged before me on this _______ day of
__________________ , 2000, by__________________ , _______________of HOPING
FOR EXPLORATION COMPANY, on behalf of said corporation.
Notary Public, State of Texas
Printed Name:__________________________
Commission Expires:___________________
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Exhibit “C”
Freestone Rider
In the event a portion or portions of the land described in this lease are 
pooled or unitized with other lands, lease or leases so as to form a 
pooled unit or units, drilling operations or production from the unitized 
premises shall maintain this lease only as to that portion of the leased 
premises within such unit or units, and, as to that portion of the leased 
premises not included in such unit or units, this lease may be 
maintained during and after the primary term by production of oil or 
gas therefrom or in any other manner provided for in this lease.
